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SMITE:

A. No. 24510.

v' BULL

In Bank.

[50 C.2d

May 16, 1958.]

BERTILLE B. SMITH, as Administratrix With Will Annexed, etc., Respondent, v. FRANK BULL, Appellant.
[1] Partnership-Dissolution-Proof.-Evidence that on February
5 of a certain year defendant wrote plaintiff's husband, with
whom he was associated in an advertising agency partnership,
that he was dissatisfied with the partnership and believed it
should be "liquidated," that on February 20 defendant signed
a lease on new premises and certified that he was conducting
an advertising agency at the new premises under a new name,
that on the same day he was notified by a finance company
having a major account in the partnership that its account
would be transferred to him, that on February 23 defendant
notified plaintiff's husband of the lease he had taken, that on
February 26 the finance company notified plaintiff's husband
that it would no longer require his "personal services" and
that because of the dissolution of the partnership it would no
longer place its account there, that on February 27 defendant
and plaintiff's husband signed and filed notices of dissolution
of the partnership, and that on February 28 defendant moved
from the partnership offices to the new location, taking with
him the firm accounts, books and all of the partnership employees except one, sustained a finding that the partnership
continued until February 27, inasmuch as defendant continued
on in the agency's office until that time.
[2] !d.-Actions-Torts by Partners-Evidence.-Evidence that in
January of a certain year a finance company holding the major
account in an advertising agency partnership in which defendant and plainti.ff's husband were associated was notified of
the impending dissolution of the partnership while plaintiff's
husband did not hear about it until defendant's letter to him
on February 5, that defendant and an employee of the agency
knew early in February that defendant would have the finance
company's account, that on February 20 defendant, on being
officially notified that he was to have this account, signed a
lease for new offices and a certificate to do business under a
new name though the partnership was not formally dissolved
until February 27, that he did not leave the partnership offices
until February 28 when he took the firm accounts, books and
all of the partnership employees except one, and that plaintiff's
McK. Dig. References: [1] Partnership, § 80; [2] Partnership,
§ 67(3); [3-5] Goodwill, § 2; [6] Goodwill, § 5; [7] Partnership,
§ 92; [8] Appeal and Error, § 1233; [9] Partnership, § 89; [10]
Partnership, § 68(2); [11] Appeal and Error, § 1268.
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husband was not notified of the finance company's decision
to dispense with his services until February 28, sustained a
finding that defendant appropriated and converted for his own
benetlt and profit the partnership business, goodwill, customers and employees.
Goodwill-Who May Acquire or Possess.-A personal service
organization, such as an advertising ageney partnership, may
have goodwill where it h11s enjoyed a fine reputation and has
been prolitable to all eoncerned.
Id.-Nature.-Although the goodwill of a business may be
the result of the personal skill, talent, experience or reputation
of an individual connected with the business, it may attach to
and continue with the business after the separation of the
individual on whom it was founded.
Id.-Nature.-The customers of a business are an essential
part of its goodwill, and without their continued custom goodwill ceases to exist, since goodwill is the expectation of continued public patronage. (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 14100.)
!d.-Construction of Contract of Sale.-When the goodwill of
a business is sold, it is not the patronage of the general public
which is sold, but that patronage whieh has become an asset
of that business.
Partnership-Liquidation-Accountability of Survivor to Estate of Deceased Partner.-Defendant partner was properly
held liable to the estate of a deceased partner for appropriation of the goodwill of an advertising agency partnership
whose major client was a finance company, where the goodwill,
if the agency had been sold to a third person, would, because
of the finance company's aceount, have been a valuable asset
of the partnership, where defendant's receipt of such account
was not a eontract subsequently made with a former client
after dissolution of the partnership but the account was
received for his own benefit and profit during continuance of
the partnership because of the satisfactory service theretofore
rendered by him, the deceased partner and an employee, and
where the inference was clear that both defendant 11nd the
employee worked toward that result without the deceased
partner's knowledge or consent and that any dissatisfaction
the finance company nwy have had with the way its account
was handled was concealed from the deceased partner.
Appeal-Questions of Law and Fact-Authority of Court.The weight of evidence and credibility of witnesses are matters
for the trier of fact, not for a reviewing court.
Partnership- Liquidation-Assets-GoodwilL-A determination of the trial court that the goodwill of an advertising
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[4] See Cal.Jur.2d, Goodwill,§ 3; Am.Jur., Goodwill, § 4 et seq.
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agency partnership had a value of $57,391.66 at the time of
dissolution and that plaintiff, whose deceased husband was
associated with defendant as a partner in such firm, was entitled to one half thereof was sustained by the testimony of
plaintiff's expert witness,. a certified public accountant, who
testified fully as to the methods used by him in computing the
value of the goodwill and that it was not customary to carry
a goodwill item on the books of a firm unless it had been
purchased by that firm, and whose testimony was not controverted.
[10] !d.-Actions-Questions of Law and Fact.-Whether defendant partner was guilty of appropriation of firm assets, including goodwill, and whether the business possessed a goodwill,
were questions of fact where the evidence was conflicting.
[11] Appeal- Questions of Law and Fact- Conclusiveness of
Findings.-When there is substantial evidence or any inference to be drawn from evidence to support findings of the
trial court, an appellate court will not make determinations of
factual issues contrary to those made by the trier of fact.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County. Vernon W. Hunt, Judge pro tern.* Affirmed.
Action by representative of estate of deceased partner
against surviving partner for an accounting. Judgment for
plaintiff affirmed.
A. G. Ritter and H. E. Lindersmith for Appellant.
Darling, Shattuck & Edmonds, Douglas L. Edmonds and
Thomas F. Call for Respondent.
CARTER, J.-Defendant Frank Bull appeals from a judgment in favor of the plaintiff, Bertille B. Smith, administratrix with will annexed of the estate of her husband, Vincent
Richard Smith, deceased. Mel Roach was also a defendant but
judgment was in his favor.
The complaint originally pleaded 10 causes of action but on
plaintiff's motion in open court, all causes of action, save the
first were dismissed. The complaint alleged the existence
of a partnership between Frank Bull and decedent, Vincent
Richard Smith, and, in brief, an appropriation and conversion
of the partnership assets, including goodwill, by defendant
*Assigned by Chairman of Judicial Council.
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Bull. The court's findings, conclusions of law and judgment
were based upon the first cause of action. The judgment
adjudicated that plaintiff was entitled to one-half of the
proceeds of four accounts, to a certain sum of money on
deposit with the Citizens National Trust and Savings Bank
of Los Angeles, and ''that plaintiff shall recover from defendant Frank Bull the sum of Twenty-eight Thousand Six Hundred Ninety-five and 83/100 Dollars with interest thereon
from the date of entry of this final judgment until paid at
the rate of 7% per annum" which sum represented one-half
of the estimated value of the goodwill of the advertising
agency known as Smith and Bull. It is from the quoted
portion of the judgment that defendant Bull appeals.
The record shows that Vincent Richard Smith and Frank
Bull had been associated together in the advertising business
for many years. Their association began in 1936 and continued thereafter in different forms. At one time the association
included others and operated as a corporation. On September 1, 1949, an oral partnership agreement was entered into
between them for the purpose of conducting an advertising
agency. While the agency, known as Smith and Bull, represented several accounts, the only major account was that of
Seaboard Finance Company and the agency was, in effect, a
''one-account'' agency. The Smith and Bull agency employed
some 21 or 22 employees and ran its own print shop in conjunction with the advertising business. Mel Roach, a defendant, was an employee of the agency and acted as general
manager and senior account executive. His duties with the
partnership centered around the Seaboard Finance account
and he spent part of each day, while he was in town, at the
Seaboard offices where he became very well acquainted with
the executives of that company. Roach had been associated
with Smith and Bull for almost the entire length of their
association although his employment had not been continuous
prior to the formation of the last partnership because of service with the armed forces and because he had been in business
for himself at one time.
Smith was ill during the latter part of 1952 and was not as
active in the partnership as he had previously been and was
away from the office part of the time. The record shows
that during this time Bull and Roach gradually took over
the handling of the Seaboard account which Smith had previously brought into the office and had controlled. While
Roach was the one who met with the Seaboard officials, the
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and the one to whom he reported and from
whom he took orders was Smith. During the latter part of
the year 1952, however, the relationship apparently changed
and Roach conferred 1.vith Bull with respect to the account.
Although it appears that in December, 1952, Seaboard officials
had expressed dissatisfaction with the handling of its account,
that matter was not brought to Smith's attention. On J anuary 15, 1953, a letter was written by Mr. Lide, the assistant
vice president of Seaboard, referring to a ''conversation between Frank Bull, Mel Roach and myself the early part of
December" in which the topic of conversation had been that
Seaboard was not "too happy" with the service rendered to
it by Smith and Bull and calling to the partners' attention
the fact that notice had been served "early in December that,
unless things improved, it might be necessary to make a change
in agencies March 1st. However, inasmuch as I will be out
of the city for approximately three weeks, I think it only fair
to extend the time to April 1st." The letter concluded with
the hope that a change in agencies would not be necessary
and that the association between Seaboard and Smith and Bull
would continue for many years. This letter was not called to
Smith's attention and, apparently only Bull, Roach and Seaboard knew of it. On February 5, 1953, Bull wrote a letter
in longhand to Smith informing him that he was dissatisfied
with Smith's handling of his personal affairs as well as his
business plans for the future and that he believed the partnership should be "liquidated." This was the first time that
Smith had learned that Bull was dissatisfied with the partnership relationship and was considering dissolution thereof.
The record eontains an undated letter from Roach to Smith
who had learned of the Seaboard letter of January 15th
through a conversation with Mr. Lide. Although the record
is not clear, this letter was probably written on, or about,
February 20, 1953. The letter, which was signed "Mel," is
as follows: ''Overheard your [Smith's] request for a eopy of
the letter from Lide regarding Seaboard's ultimatum.
''She [secretary] has not seen, and knows nothing of the
letter and Frank [Bull] and I grabbed the letter upon arrival
to prevent anyone here seeing it. In wrong hands or with
wrong interpretation, the letter could prove very embarrassing
and create a new problem in the trade.
"Yon are very welcome to read it at any time but we don't
want it moving out of the office or to have copies made. The
situation is very quiet and I have just about resolved all
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weakness and got the complaints quieted. Frank [Bull] called
upon Thompson and Appleby [executives of Seaboard] and
discussed the entire situation and everything is alright. .Any
further discussion or re-opening of the issues can only serve
to confuse and irritate all concerned there.
"Lide is in the east on business and vacation and I don't
want anything to arise in his absence which will cause him
to get on me again about doing things while he is away. I've
put Perkel [an employee] on the account with me and we
have the whole year's campaign for all medias layed out and
approved and Lide and the rest like his personality and his
ideas and new approach to old ideas.
"All's well so don't worry about it any more."
Roach testified that at some time early in January, 1953,
he notified Seaboard of the impending dissolution of the partnership, and that early in February, 1953, Seaboard informed
him that its account would be transferred to ''Frank Bull &
Company." Bull admitted that, early in February, he notified Seaboard that the partnership of Smith and Bull was
going to be dissolved. On February 20th, Bull signed a lease
on new premises located not far from the offices occupied by
the partnership ; on the same day he certified that he was
conducting an advertising agency at the new premises under
the name of "Frank Bull & Company." Bull testified that
on February 20th he was notified by Seaboard that its account
would be transferred to him. On February 23d, Bull notified
Smith of the lease he had taken. On ]'ebruary 26th, Seaboard
notified Smith that it would no longer require his "personal
services" and that because of the dissolution of the partnership of Smith and Bull, it would no longer place its account
there. On February 27th, Smith and Bull signed and filed
notices of dissolution of the partnership. .At about this time
Smith's attorney notified Bull's representative that Smith
would hold Bull accountable for the goodwill of the partnership. On February 28th, Bull moved from the partnership
offices to the new location taking with him the firm accounts,
books, and all of the partnership employees except one. On
March 1st, he commenced conducting an advertising agency
known as Frank Bull and Company.
The record shows that Roach had told an employee of
the partnership that he had the Seaboard account "in the
palm of his hand; he could take it anywhere he wanted to.
" Bull admitted that he "probably did" or "might
have" or "could have" told various people that Smith was
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"constantly off his rocker," that he was taking so much medicine that his mind was affected, that he was ''erratic and eccentric.'' The record also shows that Bull 's decision to open
his own agency was dependent upon the Seaboard account.
A certified public accountant, called and qualified as an
expert witness for the plaintiff, testified that there was a goodwill factor attached to a personal service partnership such
as the one under consideration; that it was not customary to
carry such an item on the books of an organization, firm, or
partnership, unless the goodwill had been purchased originally; that by using various known and approved methods of
computation, he was of the opinion that the goodwill factor
of the partnership should be valued at $57,391.66. This testimony was uncontradicted and defendants produced no expert
witness to testify concerning the value of the goodwill. The
record shows that after the dissolution Smith had no accounts
and no business; that he was in the process of trying to
organize a new agency at the time of his sudden death on
June 6, 1953.
The trial court found, in accord with the allegations of
plaintiff's complaint, that ''during its existence, the copartnership assets consisted of accounts receivable, bank
accounts, personal and real property and goodwill. In February, 1953, defendant Frank Bull converted and appropriated
for himself alone, and for his sole benefit and profit, the
co-partnership business, goodwill, the customers and all the
company employees, with one exception. At the time of said
conversion and appropriation the partnership had a goodwill
of fifty seven thousand three hundred ninety-one and 66/100
dollars ($57,391.66)." And the court concluded that the
plaintiff wa:s entitled to "a judgment against defendant
Frank Bull in the sum of twenty-eight thousand six hundred
ninety-five and 83/100 dollars ($28,695.83), with interest
thereon from the date of entry of the final judgment herein,
until paid, at the rate of seven per cent (7%) per annum.
This sum represents one-half (lh) of the value of the good
will of the co-partnership of Smith & Bull when converted
and appropriated by defendant Frank Bull.'' The trial court
found the date of dissolution of the partnership to be February 27, 1953.
Defendant's contentions, although inartistically phrased,
appear to be that there is no evidence to support the trial
court's findings that he had converted and appropriated the
partnership's customers and that there was a valuable good-
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will attached to the business. It is also argued that the
question of the existence of goodwill is one of law, rather
than fact, and that there is no goodwill attached to a personal
service business. Defendant argues that he had the right to
accept new business from Seaboard after the dissolution of
the partnership without obligation to his "former" partner
and without being "penalized in damages" therefor. This
latter argument apparently stems from defendant's theory
that a dissolution of the partnership took place when he
notified Smith that he intended to "liquidate" the firm.
[1] Section 15029 of the Corporations Code provides that
"The dissolution of a partnership is the change in the relation
of the partners caused by any partner ceasing to be associated
in the carrying on as distinguished from the winding up of
the business." It is obvious from the evidence heretofore set
forth that the record amply supports the trial court's determination that the partnership continued until February 27,
1953, when the notice of dissolution was signed inasmuch as
Bull continued on in the agency's offices until that time. The
record does not show that there was any change in the business
relationship between the two, or in the operation of the
agency's business, prior to that time.
[2] There is also ample support for the trial court's finding that during February, 1953, Bull appropriated and converted for his own benefit and profit the partnership business,
goodwill, customers and employees. The employees occupied
the same positions with Frank Bull and Company, at the
same salaries, as they had with Smith and Bull. It will be
recalled that Bull took with him all the partnership accounts
and that the major account, Seaboard, was notified early in
January of the impending dissolution of the partnership
while Smith did not hear about the probable dissolution until
Bull's letter to him on February 5th; that Bull and Roach
knew early in :F'ebruary that Bull would have the Seaboard
account; that Bull could not or would not have opened his
own offices without the Seaboard account. On the same day
(February 20th) that Bull was officially notified that he was
to have the Seaboard account, he signed a lease for new offices
and a certificate to do business under the name "Frank Bull
& Company" although the partnership was not formally dissolved until February 27th and he did not leave the Smith
and Bull offices until February 28th. Smith was not notified
of Seaboard's decision to dispense with his services until
February 26th.
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Defendant's argument that he is being penalized in damages and prohibited from
Seaboard employment,
after dissolution, is devoid of merit. The judgment heretofore set forth did not purport to award plaintiff damages
because of the appropriation of the Seaboard account, or any
of the profit made by Bull from that account, but was
concerned, so far as is here pertinent, with the appropriation
and value of the goodwill of the business.
[3] There is no merit to defendant's contention that a
personal service organization has no goodwill. The record
shows that Smith and Bull had, during their long association,
enjoyed a fine reputation in the advertising field and that the
association had been profitable to all concerned. [4] Although the goodwill of a business may be the result of the
personal skill, talent, experience, or reputation of an individual connected with the business, it may attach to and continue
with the business even after the separation of the individual
on whom it was founded (24 Cal.Jur.2d 142; Mackay v. Clark
Rig Bldg. Co., 5 Cal.App.2d 44 [42 P.2d 341] ). In Crutchett
v. Lawton, 139 Cal.App. 411 [33 P.2d 839}, it was held that a
contract for the sale of a medical business and the goodwill
thereof was valid. In Driskill v. Thompson, 141 Cal.App.2d
479, 484 [296 P.2d 834] (a business involving the operation
of a dance hall), the court held: "Appellant next argues that
a partnership dissolvable at will can have no goodwill, because, so it is urged, such can exist only in a going business .
. . . The continuance of that business created a goodwill regardless of who continued to operate it. A business, together
with its goodwill, may continue regardless of the form of
organization used to conduct it. Appellant continued to
operate that business and to capitalize on the goodwill of
that business as a going concern. This was an asset of the
partnership which he was using for his own benefit.'' In
Miller v. Hall, 65 Cal.App.2d 200, 205 [150 P.2d 287], where
the partnership had operated a brokerage business, the court
held: "From all of these cases, and many others, it appears
to be well recognized that the goodwill of a business may have
a considerable value, that while this value may be seriously
affected by the competition of a retiring partner the question
of such value is one to be determined in the light of all the
facts of a particular case, and that where such value exists
and is appropriated by one of the former partners for his
own use and benefit he may be required to account to the
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other partner for his interest in any such value as may appear
under the circumstances.
''In the instant case, beyond question, the good will of this
business would have had a considerable value had the business
been sold to a third party.''
Section 14100 of the Business and Professions Code defines
"The 'good will' of a business [as] the
of continued public patronage.'' The record here shows that the
Smith & Bull agency was in effect a ''one account'' agency;
that the "one account" of value was the Seaboard Finance
Company (and its predecessor) and that this account had been
serviced satisfactorily by Smith and Bull during the existence
of the partnership and for many years prior thereto. It will
also be recalled that prior to opening his own agency Bull
waited until he was sure that he would have the Seaboard
account. [5] As the court stated in Bergum v. Weber, 136
Cal.App.2d 389, 392 [288 P.2d 623], "The customers of a
business are an essential part of its goodwill. In fact, without their continued custom goodwill ceases to exist, for
goodwill is the expectation of continued public patronage.
(Bus. & Prof. Code, § 14100.)
[6] ''When the goodwill of a business is sold, it is not
the patronage of the general public which is sold, but that
patronage which has become an asset of that business."
In the case under consideration, Bull continued to conduct
an advertising agency under his own name in the same locality
as that in which th'3 partnership of Smith and Bull had operated and with the same personnel servicing the same accounts.
The trial court after hearing the evidence summarized Bull's
conduct as follows : '' \Vhy certainly he took everything that
amounted to anything in the way of business. All that was
left was the physical assets, which didn't amount to much,
but he took this big Seaboard account, which was the business
-it was the biggest portion of the business-and he took that
and he didn't ask him. He just simply took it, that's all."
Defendant's reliance upon the case of Heywood v. Sooy,
45 Cal.App.2d 423, 426, 427 [114 P.2d 361], is misplaced. It
was there said, in commenting upon the case of Little v. Caldwell, 101 Cal. 553 [36 P. 107, 40 Am.St.Rep. 89], that "the
cited case repudiates the notion that a partner is accountable
after dissolution for any allowance for what may be termed
the 'good will' of the partnership which may result in contracts of employment after dissolution. While the cited case
did not involve the precise points presented here, we believe
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that it clearly indicates the line of demarcation between 'unfinished business,' being business covered by contracts of
employment at the time of dissolution, and other matters, not
covered by contracts of employment, but which thereafter
become the subjects of contracts of employment through the
goodwill previously existing between the partnership and the
clients. As to the 'unfinished business,' a duty to perform
services rests on the partnership at the time of dissolution
and continues thereafter to rest· on the partners or the surviving partner. As to other matters, no duty to perform
services rests on the partnership at the time of dissolution
and no duty continues thereafter to rest on the partners or
surviving partner. And where no duty to perform the services rests on the partnership at the time of dissolution, such
services as may thereafter be performed by either of the
former partners under contracts of employment S1tbsequently
made with former clients cannot be considered 'unfinished
business' of the partnership at the time of dissolution." (Emphasis added.) [7] The goodwill with which we are here
concerned does not involve the profits made from Seaboard
employment subsequent to dissolution and does not concern
profits made from that employment subsequent to dissolution
or so far as goodwill is concerned any unfinished business
of Smith and Bull. We are concerned with the goodwill
of what had been a going concern whose major client was
Seaboard and the fact that had the Smith and Bull agency
been sold to a third person that goodwill, because of the
Seaboard account, would have been considered a valuable asset
of the partnership. In Little v. Caldwell, 101 Cal. 553 [36
P. 107, 40 Am.St.Rep. 89], the court was concerned with an
action brought by the widow of a deceased partner of a law
firm. It was there held that the surviving partner must
account to the estate of his deceased partner for proceeds
obtained from contracts made by the firm prior to the death
of the partner. In other words, the court was there concerned
with "unfinished business" of the partnership entered into
prior to the dissolution of the partnership. In the case at bar
it is obvious from a reading of the record that Bull received
the Seaboard account for himself because of the satisfactory
service theretofore rendered Seaboard by Smith, Roach and
himself. Bull's receipt of the Seaboard account was not a
contract "subsequently" made with a former client after dissolution of the partnership. He received the account for his
own benefit and profit during the continuance of the partner-
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ship and the inference is clear that both Bull and Roach
worked toward that result without Smith's knowledge or consent. The inference is also very clear that any dissatisfaction
Seaboard may have had with the way in which its account
was handled was concealed from Smith who was informed
by Roach, probably around Pebruary 20th, in an undated
letter, that he had ''just about resolved all weakness and got
the complaints quieted" and. that "everything is alright,"
that the "whole year's campaign for all medias [was] layed
out and approved" and that "All's well so don't worry
about it any more.'' In the same letter Smith was warned
against ''Any further discussion or re-opening of the issues''
since to do so would "only serve to confuse and irritate all
concerned'' at Seaboard.
As the trial court remarked: "It is just because people who
have become acquainted with the firm keep on going there
and doing business there. Of course, here there is the added
factor that Mr. Bull remained, and more important than that,
that Mr. Roach remained. He was the guiding figure in this
whole thing. In spite of his peculiar actions, some of which
I don't believe, he was still the one that kept this account
[Seaboard] for Mr. Bull and steered it over to him. I have
no doubt about that." The court also commented that the
name of Smith and Bull was not abandoned completely. "It
became Bull. But here was the same man ; there was never
any change whatsoever in faces. Here was the same face, but
the one they were dealing with was this Mr. Roach. This
was a one account agency practically, for all practical purposes. They had all their eggs in one basket, and this Mr.
Roach was the one who was getting into their good graces and
cementing the account there and holding onto it, and he did
hold onto it, and he carried it right along with Mr. Bull.
There was never any change at all. They hadn't seen Smith
for a long time. They weren't relying on Smith. They were
relying on this firm, and Bull just simply took the whole thing
over. He took it lock, stock and barrel. Believe me, that is
one thing the evidence does show. He just took everything."
Defendant's argument that at one of the early Pebruary
meetings Smith announced that he was going to try to get the
Seaboard account is directed to the wt>ight of the evidence with
which we are not here concerned. [8] The weight of the
evidence, and the credibility of the witnesses, are matters for
the trier of fact. And the quoted excerpts from the remarks
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of the trial judge clearly show his opinions concerning both
the weight of the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses.
[9] 'I'here is no merit to defendant's contention that the
trial court erroneously fixed the value of the goodwilL Plaintiff's expert witness, a certified public accountant, testified
fully as to the methods used by him in computing the value
of the goodwill. He also testified that it was not customary
to carry a goodwill item on the books of a firm unless it had
been purchased by that firm. His testimony was not controverted in any way and is sufficient to support the determination of the trial court that the goodwill of the partnership
had a value of $57,391.66 at the time of dissolution and that
plaintiff was entitled to one-half thereof.
Defendant's other arguments consist of a reiteration of
testimony and evidence which might be considered favorable
to him. vVith such evidence we are not here concerned.
[10] Whether or not defendant was guilty of appropriation
and conversion of firm assets, including the goodwill thereof,
was a question of fact; whether the business possessed a goodwill is also a question of fact to be determined upon the
trial of the action (111ackay v. Clark Rig Bldg. Co., 5 Cal.App.
2d 44, 60 [42 P .2d 341] ) . 'rhe trial court determined the
issues here involved adversely to defendant. [11] When
there is substantial evidence or any inference to be drawn
from the evidence to support the findings of the trial court, an
appellate court will not make determinations of factual issues
contrary to those made by the trier of faet. (Estate of Bristol,
23 Cal.2d 221, 223 [143 P.2d 689]; Estate of Teel, 25 Cal.2d
; Ambri.z v. Petrolane Ltd., 49 Cal.2d
520, 527 [154 P.2d
470, 477 [319 P.2d 1] .)
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment is affirmed.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Traynor, J., Schauer, J., and
Spence, J., concurred.
McCOMB, J., Concurring and Dissenting.-! would modify
the judgment of the superior court by striking therefrom the
following:
"3. That plaintiff shall recover from defendant Frank Bull
the sum of twenty-eight thousand six hundred ninety-five and
83/100 dollars ($28,695.83), with interest thereon from the
date of entry of this final judgment, until paid, at the rate of
seven per cent (7%) per annum."
As so modified, I would affirm the judgment for the reasons
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expressed by Mr. Presiding Justice White in the opinion prepared by him for the District Court of Appeal (Cal.App.),
318 P.2d 46.
Appellant's petition for a rehearing was denied June 11,
1958.
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In Bank.

May 16, 1958.]

MANCHESTER AVENUE COMPANY (a Corporation),
Appellant, v. H. W. STEWART, as Director of Employment, etc., Respondent.
VIRGINIA COUNTRY CLUB (a Corporation), Appellant,
v. H. W. STEWART, as Director of Employment, etc.,
Respondent.
[1] Unemployment Insurance-Employees-Caddies. -Provisions

of the Unemployment Insurance Code do not apply to services performed in caddying or carrying a golf player's clubs
by an individual who is not in the employ of the golf club
or association, and whose services are paid for solely by a member of the club.
[2] Id.-Employees-Caddies.-In an action by operators of golf
courses to recover unemployment insurance taxes paid on the
amounts the caddies had received from the players, though the
evidence disclosed that there was some control over the caddies
by either the caddie master at one golf club or the starter at
the other while the caddies were on and around the clubs'
premises awaiting an opportunity to caddie, where the evidence further showed that after a caddie had been engaged by
a player the player had exclusive control over the details of
his work and no one connected with plaintiffs had any control
over the services rendered by the caddie at any time, the control exercised by plaintiffs over the caddies fell under the
principle of law known as "control of the premises" and was
to be distinguished from the control the golf-playing member
had over the caddie.
[3] !d.-Employees-Rules Governing.-If rules are made only
for the general control of conduct of a person while on the
premises of another, mere conformity to such rules does not
[1] See Cal.Jur. 10-Yr.Supp. (1950 Rev.) Unemployment ReliefInsurance Act, § 13 et seq.
McK. Dig. Reference: [1-6] Unemployment Insurance,§ 10.

